Of course understanding actual Chinese intentions is different from knowing PLA military capabilities or possible strategies. Predicting intentions is risky, and often colored by values. So this is not a prediction that China will attack Taiwan. Rather it is an analysis of how the Chinese would use force if Beijing took the decision to attack the Republic of China on Taiwan.

But first let's dispel some of the conventional wisdom about Chinese policy toward Taiwan, which goes like this: The Chinese want peace, and economic development, and stability. They need years to "catch up" with the West. A Chinese attack on democratic Taiwan would ruin China's image, and set back China's foreign relations 10 to 15 years. Or, as Thomas Barnett wrote on page 241 of his recent The Pentagon's New Map: …" .none of the Pentagon's…scenarios about China make any sense. China wants the good life too much to succumb to its worst impulses…"  Interestingly, however, the Chinese have been telling the world that Taiwan is a "core" issue for them, that they will forego the 2008 Olympics if necessary, that Taiwan belongs to the PRC, and must be reunited with the mainland . So, maybe Beijing is not bluffing.

And if Beijing is serious about Taiwan, how might the Chinese use force against the island? Two scenarios are drawing attention:

A surprise attack carefully prepared beforehand with the objective of violently capturing and occupying Taiwan . Call it the "Capture" option.

A sequenced campaign of escalating military pressure on Taiwan to force a change of policy in Taipei without necessarily militarily occupying the island: Call it the "Coercion" option.

I. Capturing Taiwan

Under the surprise attack option, China already would have put in motion a sustained military and logistics buildup, carefully concealed, with the objective of executing a future surprise attack on Taiwan, while keeping current Chinese diplomacy and other public behavior looking "reasonable". Surprise attacks are attractive for entities that need to compensate for military deficiencies. And surprise would complicate normal American "Indicators and Warnings."  Deception operations also go hand in hand with surprise. The Chinese have shown a propensity to take risks, and their military doctrine now acknowledges preemption, as well as surprise. They call it "swift action" and "hidden efforts."

Again, the conventional wisdom argues that even if China wanted to attack Taiwan, they lack the military means to carry off an attack. But the skeptic says: Think Again…what if, for example, the Chinese are conceiling what they really have, and are building and hiding numerous additional troop ships? Or they have arrangements to draft hundreds of "junks" and other maritime craft for a Taiwan contingency? Or they have been falsifying the inventory and numbers of their sealift and airlift assets? And keeping them in hidden shelters?

Furthermore, what if the PLA has trained 30,000 rather than the American estimated 15,000 SOF/parachute troops? And what if they have more M-9/M-11 SRBM missiles than can be monitored? And what if the Chinese are using "routine" and enlarging exercises of PLAN and PLAAF assets as training "cover" for a future real scenario?

An all out Chinese surprise attack would be designed to capture, occupy, and rule Taiwan. In more limited form, a surprise attack might be designed to place just enough "shock and awe" on peaceful Taiwan to collapse the ROC government's nerves, without having to invade the island.

II. Coercing Taiwa

The conventional wisdom argues that the Chinese would not use force in sequenced, incremental fashion, as it would give Taiwan and the US too much time to react. But the skeptic wonders: What if PLA strategists are designing a coercive military strategy which, when combined with diplomatic and economic pressures and enticements, focuses just under American response thresholds? Or what if Beijing intends to push just far enough to achieve a partial fait accompli designed to collapse the ROC government's will? Or the PLA plans to attack when the US is preoccupied elsewhere (…as Washington is now with only one aircraft carrier in the Pacific area)?

Conventional wisdom again argues that the Chinese would not experiment with escalation since, for example, PLA missile launches of 1995/96 failed to reverse Taiwan's move toward democratic elections. But those missile launches, designed to coerce, while not hitting Taiwan, created real anxiety on the island nation , and nearly collapsed the Taiwan Stock Market, and produced billions of dollars of disinvestment—some say as much as $14 billion.

Moreover, signaling their intent and seriousness, and mixing force with diplomacy, is something the Chinese clearly have done in the past:

Witness Beijing's diplomacy about Korea in early fall 1950; or PLA warnings toward India in 1962; or Chinese warnings to Vietnam in early 1979 ; or PLAAF penetration of the Taiwan Strait middle line in summer 1999.

Thus coercion by Beijing would aim at reversing threatening trends, creating instability on Taiwan, or even a major breakdown in the ROC's ability to govern…trends that Beijing would exploit with offers to Taiwanese "patriots" to join a "greater China." Indeed, it seems to me that Beijing has already activated th initial destabilization measures in conjunction with other, more benign appeals to Taiwanese opinion elites, legislators, and Taiwanese business investors. (As Lenin once said, "We will sell the capitalists the rope by which they will hang themselves.")

III. PRC Guiding Parameters:

Whether one aligns with the surprise "Capture" scenario, or the sequenced, "Coercion" scenario, the Chinese now have an inventory of military attack capabilities which is growing in numbers and sophistication, as they plugthe more obvious gaps in their amphibious and area -denial capabilities, their C4ISR, and in joint operations and logistics reform. Given these realities, what overall campaign parameters would guide a Chinese attack on Taiwan?

1. Keep the war damage limited…since killing the Taiwan goose that lays the golden eggs is not in China's interest. Post conflict reconstruction and Taiwanese resentment need to be minimized. A short war also limits the damage to China's international reputation. Thus I would rule out SRBM attacks on Taiwan's heavily urbanized and largely defenseless population.

2. Keep the conflict brief and control escalation. If the Chinese attack, they would need a quick win since the Americans are probably coming to Taiwan's assistance. A prolonged conventional slug-out between nuclear armed US and Chinese forces is a very bad idea.

3. Keep operational constraints manageable and orchestrated to China's advantage. Power projection and logistical sustainment are serious problems for the PLA. So is vulnerability to US high tech intervention. Thus one can expect the PLA to use mixtures of conventional and asymmetrical forces, and stealth operations, managing resources and re-supply tempos to feed its Taiwan attack objectives. Beijing could hit hard at first, hold Taiwanese assets at risk, then see if Taipei came to terms.

IV The Multifaceted Attack.

If Beijing decided on an orchestrated attack, the PLA has a wide repertoire of military capabilities, and they logically might be coordinated in an integrated campaign beginning with electronic disruption. The main aspects of the attack could involve four sub-campaigns: Destabilization Operations, Blockage/Quarantine, Invasion, and Missile Attack. The basis of each sub-campaign is clear enough:

These could involve harassment of commercial shipping and/or air traffic; information/disinformation warfare attacks; declaring the Taiwan Strait an "internal" water; or interfering with Taiwan's oil tanker lifeline, or "protecting" it from "terrorists" or "sabotage"( Taiwan consumes @ 250000 tons of crude oil daily); or special operations against critical Taiwan infrastructure nodes or facilities; or calls for "liberation" from Taiwanese "compatriots;" or computer attacks on key communications, banks, transportation hubs, and air and sea traffic controls, or more ballistic missile tests near Taiwan; or seizure of offshore islands like Kimen and Matsu.

A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's western ports is more feasible than the island's east coast; east side operations would overextend PLAN/PLAAF capabilities and expose them to external intervention. Also, blockades take time to set up and are very visible. However, the PLAN has more than 60 diesel submarines; inserting dozens of them into the Strait would seriously complicate Taiwanese seaborne transport and re-supply.

Should the Chinese opt for a more explicit, high profile naval/air blockade of Taiwan, area- denial assets include high tech platforms like the PLAN's four Russian Kilo-class submarines (projected to be eight), and surface combat vessels like the Luhu-class guided missile destroyers with their foreign designed diesel-gas turbines, weapons, and fire control systems, and the Russian Sovremenny destroyers with their SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles. In April 2001, the Bush Administration offered Taiwan new diesel electric submarines, P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers (but not equipped with the Aegis anti-missile system), and the PAC-3 TBM defense. But the sale has not yet gone through.

For China to take Taiwan by force, it would require an invasion. Chinese air superiority would have to come first so that Chinese Navy barges, troop carriers, and airborne troops had a chance. I assume the PLAAF might first throw in its 2nd and 3rd generation aircraft (MIG 23 and MIG 25s) to bleed off the ROCAF's air-to-air missiles. But in getting ashore, the PLAN would face serious obstacles : Taiwan has rocky coasts and inhospitable shores opposite the mainland. Nevertheless, the Chinese navy has underway a purchase of more Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines with advanced sonar equipment, in addition to its 60+ older diesel powered submarines. And the PLA Navy is adding new principal surface combatants to its current 60, to include Russian-guided missile destroyers and guided missile frigates.

The potentially starkest option for Beijing, presumably in coordination with an invasion of Taiwan, would be a ballistic and cruise missile attack against Taiwan's principal land targets, air bases, and naval facilities…while diplomatically holding Japanese and possibly Filipino bases and support hostage to PLA MRBM threats. Toward Taiwan, PLA short range missiles' quick flight time makes it very difficult for Taiwan to counter them, currently with the Patriot PAC-2s, and possibly even with the planned PAC-3s. China's SRBM buildup has been steady and ominous; the PRC now has approximately 550 to 600 M-9 and M 11 missiles in the south, and is adding 50 to 70 per year. A Chinese missile attack could cause havoc on the island . If China launched SRBM attacks against Taiwan, I think Beijing would seek to spare Taiwan population centers, possibly because of fear of ROCAF and/or US retaliation against Chinese cities. However, Taiwan might not show such counter restraint; Taiwan officials have been talking publicly about holding Chinese cities, and the Three Gorges Dam, hostage if China attacked.

V. US/ROC Reactions

Should China attack Taiwan, either as a surprise jump-off from ongoing naval and air exercises, or in a sequenced, testing manner, the fundamental question for American war fighters is: How well are US Air Force and Navy assets positioned, configured, and supported to challenge a Chinese attack? The US Navy is down to one carrier battle group in the Pacific. US B-52s are back on Guam, but Air Force fighter jets stationed in Hawaii, South Korea, Alaska, in Japan and on Okinawa, would require extensive tanker and reconnaissance support in a Taiwan operation. So the initial US military reaction would have to come from naval carrier air. If the US is denied offensive operations out of Japan and the Philippines, but reconnaissance and support functions were permitted, that simplifies things for the aircraft carriers. A carrier conducting strike packages into the Strait would need underway replenishment every three to five days during operations. If Manila and Tokyo denied all basing support to the US, then American support and reconnaissance would probably have to fall back on Guam or possibly Singapore…both are nearly 1,300+ nautical miles from the Taiwan Strait. The B-52s at Guam (and possibly B-1s and B-2s brought into Guam) could bring precision guided weapons to bear on a Chinese attack. But the whole operation…especially blunting the PLAAF fighter attack…would be much easier if Japanese bases stayed open and the Philippines and Singapore also offered combat basing to the US.

Moreover, if Taiwanese forces could not hold out, could the US get enough interdiction onto PLAAF/PLAN assets hitting Taiwan before PLAN and PLA assault forces had a secure bridge across the Strait? The answer is dependent on how fast the Chinese moved, their success with surprise, where US forces were in the region, and how our allies and friends participated. It would be a race against time. Another issue: What about PLA facilities on the Mainland supporting the attack on Taiwan? Would Taipei and Washington (together or independently) conclude they had to strike those mainland Chinese facilities? And what would be the Chinese reaction? Finally of course is the challenge of how ( and if) Washington and Taipei would fight together in order to synchronize actions and deconflict assets.

VI. Conclusion

I assume that deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan remains a principal goal of the US and Taiwanese governments and, of course, the US Pacific Command in Hawaii. The situation across the Taiwan Strait is not static, and it requires continued attention, planning and coordination by Washington and Taipei as long as the People's Republic of China refuses to renounce the use of force regarding the "Taiwan issue."

Lawrence Grinter is Professor of Asian Studies, Air War College, United States of America. These views are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Air Force or the US government.