重"党政军 " 轻"物权法"

David Kelly
East Asian Institute
National University of Singapore

Deutsche Welle 17 March 2006

China’s rapid economic growth, increasingly sophisticated diplomacy, and military modernization efforts are supporting increased activism and expanded influence both within Asia and in other regions of the world.  Within the span of a single generation, China has moved from near isolation to a hub of the globalized economy, from fielding a backward, bloated military to a much more professional force boasting pockets of high-tech excellence, and from hostility to global institutions to active participation in multilateral organizations such as the UNSC and WTO.  As China’s power grows, Beijing will have more options in using economic, diplomatic, and military instruments to advance its national interests in East Asia and on the world stage. With increased power and influence come increased responsibilities and the potential for clashes of interest with the U.S. and other great powers.  China may assume the role of a responsible stakeholder in the international system, but that outcome is not certain.  China’s choice of how to exercise its increasing global influence will affect its Asian neighbors and the world community.

This conference is designed to provide participants with a comprehensive assessment of China’s increased regional and global activism, the policy choices Chinese leaders face, the implications of increasing Chinese influence and activism for U.S. security interests, and policy options to influence outcomes in directions favorable for U.S. interests.

Featured speakers include senior government officials involved in establishing and managing defense and security policy and a wide range of defense experts.  This symposium will be of interest to specialists in national security affairs in and out of government, military officers, the diplomatic and attaché corps, and members of the media.

China’s Global Activism

How is China using economic, diplomatic, and military tools to increase its influence and pursue its interests in Asia and other regions of the world?

What can we infer about China’s strategic objectives from the pattern of its increased global activism?

When conflicts arise within China’s grand strategy, how does Beijing balance and resolve those conflicting interests?

Military Modernization and International Influence

Taiwan has been the primary focus of China’s military modernization, but the PLA is also expanding its conventional power projection capabilities. What are current PLA land, naval, and air capabilities, and how are they likely to change over the next decade?  What missions will drive development of power projection capabilities, and how will they influence China’s international role?

China has invested considerable resources in developing a new generation of conventional and nuclear missiles and associated C4I systems that will be deployed over the next decade. How will these new capabilities affect China’s role within Asia and its relationships with other major powers?

China has increased participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions and broadened the scope of military exchanges and security cooperation efforts. Where are China’s military diplomacy efforts directed, and what contributions do they make to PRC national security goals?   

Regional Perspectives on China’s Global Activism (Africa, Latin America, and the Near East and South Asia)

How do governments, the business community, and citizens view China’s increased economic and diplomatic presence in their region?

How much interest do countries have in increased military exchanges and security cooperation with China? What do they hope to achieve via this cooperation?

Have developmental assistance, education programs, and soft power been effective tools of Chinese public diplomacy?

What impact does China’s increased presence and influence have on U.S. interests?

Policy Implications for the United States

What does the pattern of China’s global activism suggest about Beijing’s willingness to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder”? Which issues are most problematic, and what can the U.S. do to make cooperative Chinese approaches more likely?

How effective are existing USG policies, alliances, and diplomatic relationships in sustaining international support for the war on terrorism and other U.S. foreign policy objectives? What, if any, effect have Chinese activities had on the willingness of potential partners to cooperate with the United States?

Will increased Chinese global influence affect the USG’s ability to carry out its international agenda?  If so, what adjustments should the USG make to its policies?

How can the U.S. achieve consensus on a grand strategy to guide relations with China?

A YOUNG TURK IN CHINA’S ESTABLISHMENT: THE MILITARY WRITINGS OF LIU YAZHOU

By Alfred Chan

Liu Yazhou, a 53 year-old PLA general, erstwhile novelist, and rising political star, has published a series of frequent and provocative essays in China over the last few years to considerable acclaim—and controversy. In a regime where political expression is strictly limited, and where discussion of political issues may be construed as “revealing state secrets,” for someone to speak with establishment credentials and without censorship can be a startling indication of policy discussion and change.

Liu’s essays violate many taboos and restrictions, covering a wide range of topics such as strategy, geopolitics, the nature of war and conflict, and China’s relations with Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. His underlying theme is unvarnished distress with corruption and conformity, and a plea for accelerated political reform to remedy China’s ills. While laced with reverent quotations from top Chinese leaders, Liu’s writings can be construed as indirect and direct criticisms of their policies. These arguments have dazzled as well as upset his readers; supporters praise his boldness and insight, and detractors condemn his alleged militarism and demagoguery.

A son-in-law of the late Chinese president Li Xiannian, Liu is a “princeling” (privileged offspring of a high official) who was promoted quickly and is now Deputy Political Commissar and a Lieutenant General in the PLA Air Force. He has traveled extensively overseas, including a term as a visiting professor at Stanford University, and is one of the few PLA officials to have visited Taiwan.

Liu’s first big splash was an essay on the October 1949 Jinmen battle circulated on the Internet last year, when tensions between China and Taiwan prompted hawks in Beijing to urge a military showdown, putting enormous pressure on the civilian leadership [1]. Liu reviewed the lessons of the Jinmen debacle, in which a PLA invasion was routed by Guomindang forces, with the loss of more than 9,000 troops. He attributes the devastating loss to complacency, along with poor planning and command.

According to Liu, history threatened to repeat itself in the late 1990s when hardline officials argued that Taiwan must be fought and that victory was certain. Disclosing a previously unseen Jiang Zemin quote—“A war in the Taiwan Strait is inevitable” (“Lessons of the Jinmen Battle”)—without providing the context, he argues that the lessons of Jinmen must be heeded, especially because the Taiwan issue is now internationalized and considerably more complicated.

In an essay entitled “The Grand National Strategy,” likely written in 2001, Liu repudiates the idea of taking advantage of the September 11 aftermath to conquer Taiwan with an overpowering attack [2]. Taiwan should not be the focus of China’s strategy: the more the Chinese fixate on it, he argues, the more they will be manipulated by the U.S. and Taiwan. This obsession has provided Washington with undue leverage over Beijing for the last half century.

In the same essay, Liu privileges diplomacy over fighting, and suggests that China can effectively engage Taiwan by exploiting Taiwan’s multi-party system. China can deal with not only with the Democratic Progressive Party, but also with other political forces, a view that may have contributed to Hu Jintao’s decision to invite Guomindang leader Lin Chan and James Soong of the People First Party to visit China in April/May of this year.

His appeals for moderation notwithstanding, Liu’s discourses on strategy reveal that he is a nationalist as well as a realist. His ‘dream’ is to have a strong army and country. “The sole purpose of power is to pursue even greater power,” and “national interest should forever be the highest principle of our action,” he writes in “Faith and Morality.” [3] Balance-of-power and divide-and-rule tactics seem to be his guiding principles.

The projection of Chinese influence in international affairs should be specifically calibrated to the West in general and United States in particular, Liu argues. Citing Huntington’s thesis on the clash of civilizations, Liu views the alleged clash between the West and the Muslim world as a great opportunity. He argues in “The Grand National Strategy” that China’s improved relations with Muslim countries are an excellent move, since China “should do what the West fears.” In a moment of great exuberance, Liu maintains that China should have an outlet to the Indian Ocean, what he terms “China’s new boundary.”

Liu is more ambivalent about Sino-U.S. relations. While he acknowledges that the United States, as the world’s dominant power, will inevitably pursue policies that antagonize China, he believes America realizes that the forces for bilateral cooperation are greater than conflict. U.S. leaders would never instigate a full-fledged military confrontation. The United States is to be regarded as neither a wholesale enemy nor an ally.

Militarily, he urges Chinese leaders to learn from U.S. innovations in the military and its recruitment system. China’s military strategy is obsolete, he says in “Faith and Morality,” as its experts today still strategize of a “people’s war” of “luring the enemy into a trap.” It is a ‘tragedy’ that in China, from the top to the bottom, “those who are intelligent do not make policy, those who make policy are not intelligent.”

Indeed, as a Lieutenant General with a primarily civilian background, Liu emphasizes the important role of the military. Intervention during the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 stabilized the regime, he asserts in “Faith and Morality,” and the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 contributed greatly to reforms. Deng Xiaoping used the war to consolidate his authority vis-à-vis the leftist remnants in the party. In the same article, Liu contends that China, by invading Vietnam, signaled the abandonment of “phoney” socialism, and also “avenged and vindicated” (chuqi) the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia.
In return, China’s reforms benefited from subsequent U.S. investment and economic, military, scientific, and technological assistance in a decade-long “honeymoon,” thus ensuring that China would stand firm, even after the worldwide collapse of communism. As in other developing countries, the Chinese military is a force for reform, and modernization without the participation of the military is inconceivable, although Liu does not explain why this should be so.

Toward the Japanese Liu is a nationalist. While his essays paint Japan as a “fierce” neighbor, he argues that a strong, independent Japan apart from an alliance with the United States would be easier to deal with. In such a case, Japan could act as a buffer, and to that end China would do well to support Japan’s membership as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Last April, however, Liu was angered by Japan’s announcement to begin drilling for oil in disputed areas of the East China Sea. His attempt to convene a conference on Sino-Japanese relations was reportedly prohibited by Hu Jintao. Liu then published an angry manifesto on the Internet, “Military Forum,” co-signed by nine military colleagues bluntly denouncing the Japanese for being haughty, provocative, and bullying [4]. It urged annulment of all treaties that renounced reparations—using a referendum if necessary—and immediate reopening of talks for reparations covering issues such as war crimes, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the textbook and Yasakuni shrine controversies (“Military Forum”).

Liu’s most daring ideas are those championing political reform and decrying corruption, censorship, and China’s “backward” political system. The strategic threat to national security, he argues in “The Grand National Strategy,” comes from within rather than from without. To strengthen the country, it is imperative that China’s leaders introduce political reform, especially when the dynamism of economic growth begins to slow. In an apparent dig at ruling elites, he warns that upholding stability as a primary goal and maintaining the status quo was the root cause of Soviet dissolution. Political reform for Liu requires a democratic yielding of power, a transformation of the people as their own masters, and rigorous methods to make the country prosperous, although, bowing to official orthodoxy, he is careful to concede that reform should include the “consolidation of the CCP’s ruling position” as well.

Democracy, he argues in “Conversation with a Secretary of a County Party Committee,” is a demand, a way of expression, an exchange process, and a way to resolve problems [5]. Rules, fairness, and citizen consciousness, the prerequisites of democracy, all have to be cultivated. Rampant corruption is the greatest political challenge and a dictatorial system based on the monopoly of power is itself fertile ground for corruption. In contrast to Asia’s other rising power, Liu notes that China’s poor are not only deprived of adequate food and clothing but they do not even have the vote.

The oppressed peasantry, Liu continues, which poses the greatest challenge to communist orthodoxy, must be thoroughly liberated and turned into citizens able to engage in active political participation. If political reform is further delayed, revolution from below may occur, he warns in “Conversation.”

As a military officer Liu Yazhou’s free airing of provocative views on both foreign and domestic issues, especially his calls for political reform and the freedom of expression, is unprecedented. Though a realist, a nationalist and a hardliner against Japan, Liu’s moderate views contrast sharply with those who still preach “people’s war” or the use of nuclear weapons. In his calls for new thinking and introspection, Liu represents military young Turks dissatisfied with the civilian leadership’s inability to deal with corruption and social crises. Fears of praetorian intervention in civilian politics may be exaggerated, but the issues Liu raises are real indeed.

Alfred L. Chan is an associate professor of political science at Huron University College, University of Western Ontario, Canada. He thanks Don Hickerson for editing the manuscript.

Notes
1. Liu Yazhou, “Jinmen zhanyi jiantao” (Lessons of the Jinmen Battle), April 2004,
http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=2882.
2. Liu Yazhou, “Da guoce” (The Grand National Strategy),” n.d., http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=2884.
3. Liu Yazhou, Xinnian yu daode” (Faith and Morality), January 2, 2005, http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=5840.
4. Liu Yazhou, Peng Guangqian, Liu Hongji, et al., “Junfang yantaohui: yuren zunwo, bixian zizun: ribenren weihe duiwo changkuang” (Military Forum: If one expects respect, one must respect oneself: Why are the Japanese so recklessly provocative?), April 14, 2005, http://www.qian-ming.net/gb/viewarticle_gb.aspx?vID=818.
5. Liu Yazhou, “Yu yiwei xianwei shuji de tanhua” (Conversation with a Secretary of a County Party Committee), December, 2004, http://www.bjsjs.net/news/news.php?intNewsId=1304.

As the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang continues, there is growing impatience - within the Bush administration and among some major American media - not with North Korea, but with China and its perceived inability or unwillingness to pressure its North Korean "comrade." Shortly after President Bush publicly vented his irritation with Beijing by telling the world that he reminded President Jiang Zemin about his commitment to resolve the North Korean crisis, the Pentagon dispatched the 97,000-ton aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to the Pacific. Not many, however, have noticed the quiet build up of frustration in China vis-à-vis North Korea or noted China's unusual military exercise on its frozen northern plains. Beijing may not say it in public, but it is no less frustrated and worried about North Korea than Washington, and like the US it does not have an abundance of good options.

Like President Bush, China too has all its limited options on the table. This was signaled by an unusual military exercise held without much fanfare. In mid-January - less than a month after North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - the People's Liberation Army (PLA) threw itself into unusually early large-scale military exercises. Across the frozen plains of the north, in the deep seas to the east, and up in the sky, various branches of the PLA performed drills involving complex scenarios and sub-zero temperatures. In the past decade or so, the PLA has usually not conducted drills until after Chinese New Year, and has normally focused its training in areas of the Taiwan Strait. The emphasis on cold weather for both the ground and naval forces indicates heightened concerns about the ongoing crisis in the Korean Peninsula. In the winter of 1950-51, the 9th Army Group (150,000 strong) on the eastern front suffered severe frostbite, which disabled 22% of its forces and some 1,000 dead. This time, the PLA seems determined to avoid unnecessary attrition should such an intervention become imperative.

The PLA's preparation for subzero environments, however, does not suggest that China has frozen its strategic calculus regarding the current crisis and its likely outcome. Diplomacy always remains as the first and most important option. But China is painfully aware of the limits of diplomacy and especially that of its ability to pressure North Korea. Contrary to the expectations in Washington, China's limited options place it in a severe dilemma.

On one hand, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with nuclear weapons is not only a destabilizing factor, but also a dangerous and unpredictable neighbor. China could in the future also become the target of nuclear blackmail. On the other hand, China's limited influence on the DPRK is restricted to the economic arena, and the DPRK already made it clear that any economic sanctions would lead to war. Although this was directed at the US, it also implies other that other nations would face similar danger. Finally, Pyongyang made clear that it intends only to talk to Washington and others should get out of its way.

The lessons of the Korean War, if any, suggest that China should never get into something not started by itself, and that China should intervene only if there is a reasonable chance of success. Historical legacies, however, should be treated with caution. The current crisis in the Korean Peninsula is seen as more dangerous because of the added nuclear factor. China's national interests today are far more tied up with the stability of the peninsula. In the past few decades, China has become a profoundly conservative nation in Northeast Asia. It became the largest export market for both South Korea and Taiwan in 2002, a year after it joined the WTO. The same year also saw China become the largest direct foreign investment recipient country in the world, receiving some $50 billion and surpassing the US for the first time in history. Even a limited conflict in the region may have grave consequences for a much globalized Chinese economy. The crisis could also lead to a considerably nuclearized Northeast Asia where Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan are all nuclear capable. In other words, doing nothing is perhaps also dangerous in this fluid region where major powers interact, engage, retreat, and come back only to face another round of geopolitical tug-of-war.

These considerations, among others, have led to a new round of debate among Chinese foreign and defense analysts. One of the emerging schools of thoughts is arguing for a proactive posture regarding the ongoing, fast-changing crisis.

Shi Yinghong, a prominent analyst in Beijing, argues that China's strategic environment has been fundamentally altered as a result of the Korean nuclear crisis. Perhaps Shi's analysis is most significant because for the first time, a People's Republic of China (PRC) analyst is publicly blaming the DPRK for starting the ball rolling and creating a situation in which China could soon face an even bigger threat to its security. As to the current standoff, Shi believes that the "extreme rhetoric" and "near extreme behavior" of the DPRK are the major obstacles for a peaceful resolution. The US is also to blame for its refusal to have a dialogue and to provide security guarantees for the DPRK. Shi argues strongly that China's primary strategic interest is to exert maximum influence on the DPRK and to coordinate with utmost effort with the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and Russia in order to "shield" the DPRK from weapons of mass destruction. To what extent Shi's proactive posture is shared by other policy analysts remains to be seen, although his views were recently published on the official People's Daily website.

Beijing's current reluctance to get involved in the crisis may be explained by the consequences of the Korean War. For Beijing, the three-year war, which ended fifty years ago, still haunts China's foreign and defense policy makers. Although the PLA fought the war into a stalemate with the most powerful military in the world, Beijing paid a tremendous price economically, diplomatically and strategically, including sowing the seeds of the future Sino-Soviet friction. On the other hand, the war also tested the limits of China's cooperation with both Russia and the DPRK, and its antagonism with the US and South Korea.

The US attempt to "outsource" the resolution of the current Korean nuclear crisis to China, however, misses the roots of the problem (failure by both Washington and Pyongyang to abide by the 1994 Framework). It also indicates that the US is out of touch with a profoundly changed Northeast Asia where the lines between the Cold War friends and foes have significantly blurred in the past few decades. Although Beijing sided with the DPRK during the three-year bloody war (1950-53), China is not in a position to dictate to the DPRK even on less sensitive, non-security policies, let alone able to switch on and off the Korean crisis, as some of the Bush officials claimed.

Throughout the three-year conflict, China bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. The post-war DPRK official propaganda, however, scarcely acknowledged China's role. The fact that the Chinese military completely withdrew from the DPRK in 1958 indicated the strain between the two communist countries. Over the following thirty years, whenever Moscow and Beijing were locked in a fierce intra-bloc conflict, the DPRK maximized its interests by playing Beijing against Moscow and vice versa.

China's pragmatism in both domestic and foreign policies during the reform decades (1979-now) has further strained ties with Pyongyang, for at least two reasons. One is China's pursuit of "normalized" relations with both the South and North. While diplomatic ties with Seoul have meant more trade and investment from the ROK, Beijing has also gradually ended its "friendly" pricing practice with the DPRK.

The second reason for strained Sino-DPRK ties is that China has conducted its relations with the DPRK within a broader regional environment of peace and stability conducive to China's economic development. As a result, Beijing has gradually assumed a more balanced posture in its policies toward the two Koreas and made it public that it opposes any instability arising from either side of the Demilitarized Zone.

As a result of these developments, China has largely been drawn into the world's trading system while the DPRK finds itself in not-so-splendid isolation. By the time Kim Il-song passed away in 1994, Sino-DPRK ties were considerably weakened, if not lost. Occasional high-level visits did occur, but the trust between the two sides, essential for any alliance, was gone. If anything, the younger Kim has systematically purged his regime of anyone with strong Chinese links. For Beijing, managing relations with the "dear leader" has been a tricky business.

Unlike his father, who was educated in Manchuria, spoke Chinese, and joined the Chinese Communist Party, the younger Kim was born in Russia and seemed obsessed with that country's vast landscape of 11 time zones prior to his current challenge to the world's strongest power. In July 2002, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Pyongyang. This was followed by Kim-Putin summit in Vladivostok on August 23. By this time, the younger Kim had had three summit meetings with Russian President Putin, including Kim's two visits to Russia within a year and the first ever visit by a Russian president to the DPRK (July 2000).

Prior to the current crisis, while Russian-DPRK ties were warming up, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang were cooling down considerably. One souring point was the issue of North Korean refugees in China. Beijing blamed certain groups and the media in Japan and South Korea for 'stirring up' the refugee issue. Chinese officials also blamed North Korea for failing to prevent its own people from coming to China. Meanwhile, Beijing was also irritated by Kim's decision to set up a special economic zone at Sihuiju across the Yalu River and then selecting a Chinese private businessman, Yang Bin, as its director. Yang was arrested shortly afterward for tax evasion.

For Beijing, the standoff may not lead to a simple replay of the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis, which ended with a diplomatic solution. Although both sides still seem to be leaving the door open for dialogue, this crisis is more reminiscent of the 1950s. Before the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War, the US first underestimated the DPRK by casting the Korean Peninsula outside the US defense perimeter, and then plunged in headfirst in September 1950. Now the Bush administration may be repeating the same mistake. After switching off the dialogue pursued by Clinton and Kim Dae Jung, Washington's only remaining options may be economic and military pressure.

China does not want the diplomatic windows to close. But despite China's obvious reluctance to moving the issue of North Korea's nuclear non-compliance to the Security Council and risking a confrontation, a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled for February 12. The coming days will severely test the diplomatic skills of China and its Security Council partners in keeping the crisis from blowing into a second Korean War or worse.

Yu Bin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wittenberg University and Senior Research Associate at the Shanghai Institute of American Studies. His most recent book is Mao's Generals Remember Korea.