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May 14 China, US Vow to Restore Comprehensive Military TiesXinhua, May 11, 2006
China and the United States agreed on Wednesday to step up military exchanges at all levels after talks between the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific and Chinese military leaders.
"As an important part of bilateral relations, China-US military ties have gradually been restored and developed in recent years," Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan told U.S. Admiral William Fallon.
China-U.S. military ties were broken off in 2001 when a Chinese fighter aircraft was rammed and damaged by a U.S. surveillance plane over the South China Sea.
Fallon's visit, the second to China since he assumed his post last February, was expected to help warm U.S. military ties with China.
The planned 45-minute meeting between Cao and Fallon was extended to 90 minutes in order to cover a wide range of issues, sources with the Chinese Defense Ministry said.
China had always held a positive attitude on improving China-U.S. military ties, Cao said. Contacts between senior military officials, exchanges of military academies and mechanism-based exchanges between the two countries had gone ahead as scheduled.
Fallon said it was important for the United States and China to maintain sound and stable military relations.
He hoped the two forces would step up exchanges and contacts at all levels and promote mutual understanding and trust.
"As the Taiwan issue has a bearing on the core interests of China, China will ensure the peace and stability of Taiwan on the basis of the one-China principle and improve the relations across the Strait," Cao said.
"We will show the greatest sincerity and make the utmost efforts to strive for peaceful reunification."
Urging the United States to clearly oppose "Taiwan independence", Cao called for an end to U.S.-Taiwan military contacts and U.S. sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan.
Reaffirming the U.S. government's one-China stance, Fallon said he hoped the two sides across the Taiwan Strait would seek peaceful solutions to differences and refrain from conflict.
Fallon also invited a Chinese delegation to observe U.S. military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region.
Before his talks with Cao, Fallon met with People's Liberation Army Deputy Chief of Staff Ge Zhenfeng and Chinese Foreign Ministry officials.
The defense departments of China and the United States have restored a series of consultation mechanisms on maritime issues, humanitarian disaster relief and military environmental protection.
Last October, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld paid an official visit to China, his first since taking office in 2001.
This year will see an increased exchanges of military institutions and staff between the two forces, sources with Chinese Defense Ministry said, adding a senior Chinese officer would visit the United States in July.
The long discussions on installing a hotline between the two defense ministries were expected to produce a result this year,the sources said.
Fallon's weeklong trip will also take him to military academies and facilities in Xi'an, in Shaanxi Province, Hangzhou, in Zhejiang Province, and Shenyang, in Liaoning Province.
Fallon will give a press briefing in Shenyang at the end of his tour on Monday. China and US May Establish Military HotlineMure Dickie in Beijing, Financial Times, May 11, 2006
Beijing and Washington are moving towards establishing a hotline betweentheir defence ministries and have agreed to step up military exchanges, Chinese state media said on Thursday.
A senior US administration official said last month that Washington was "really disappointed" over the lack of progress on the issue, which remained "an area of frustration". May 12 China Poised to Attain Superpower Status: US Intelligence CzarA. Tom Grunfeld
The US Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, warned that China's steady military and economic expansion may ultimately lead to Beijing attaining superpower status on a par with the United States. Pentagon Report Singles Out China as Potential Military RivalAgence France-Presse, 04 February 2006
A major review of US military strategy singled out China as the country with the greatest potential to challenge the United States militarily.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) rated Russia as a "country in transition" that is unlikely to pose a military threat on the scale of the Soviet Union, and said India is emerging as "a great power and a key strategic partner."
The review, which is conducted every four years, said a key goal for the US military in the coming years will be to "shape the choices of countries at a strategic crossroads."
The QDR report noted China's steady but secretive military buildup since 1996.
"Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that over time offset traditional US military advantages absent US counter strategies," the report said.
The pace and scope of China's military buildup already puts regional military balances at risk, it said.
It listed an array of high end military capabilities that China is investing in.
They include electronic and cyber-warfare, counter-space operations, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced integrated air defense systems, next generation torpedoes, advanced submarines, land and sea-base strategic nuclear missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
"These capabilities, the vast distances of the Asian theater, China's continental depth, and the challenge of en route and in-theater US basing place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied area," the report said.
It said US policy aims at encouraging China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization, rather than military threat or intimidation.
But, it said, "The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization."
"The United States encourages China to take actions to make its intentions clear and clarify its military plans."
Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, said the United States wanted to be a partner in China's peaceful rise, but have the means to dissuade! it from taking an adversarial path.
"We think China should have a military capability sufficient to meet its genuine security needs," he told reporters. He indicated those should be regional in scope.
The report also flags US worries about Russia, citing the erosion of democracy there and restrictions on non-governmental organizations and press freedoms.
"Internationally, the United States welcomes Russia as a constructive partner but views with increasing concern its sales of disruptive weapons technologies abroad and actions that compromise the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of other states," it said.
In the case of India, the report foresaw "continued and increased strategic cooperation."
May 06 Chinese Military Linked to Missile SmugglingTHE WASHINGTON TIMES, April 20, 2006
Court papers made public yesterday in the case of a California man who pleaded guilty to trying to smuggle anti-aircraft missiles into the United States show that a Chinese general and state-run manufacturer are linked to the crime. Chao Tung Wu, 51, of La Puente, Calif., pleaded guilty yesterday at U.S. District Court in Los Angeles to conspiracy to smuggle Chinese QW-2 anti-aircraft missiles into the United States. It was the first conviction under a 2004 anti-terrorism law aimed at preventing the spread of shoulder-fired and portable anti-aircraft missiles. Wu and a second defendant who is awaiting trial, Yi Qing Chen, met an undercover FBI agent and sought to sell 200 QW-2s, as well as launcher and operational hardware for the missiles, according to court papers. A statement of facts read in court yesterday revealed that Wu had offered to provide enough missiles "for a regiment" of soldiers. Wu told the undercover agent that the plan for getting the missiles out of China involved the help of a "corrupt customs broker" in China and falsified export papers, the statement said. The deal involved a "Gen. Wang" in China who was to supply the weapons. China's military has been linked to past illicit arms deals, including the attempted sale of AK-47 assault rifles to Los Angeles street gangs. Wu informed the agent that there were 24 containers of weapons for sale, including the missiles, and that the minimum purchase would be eight containers.
Documents provided to the agent included a proposal for the sale from the Xinshidai company, which makes the QW-2 and other missiles. "The weapons proposed in this deal with the [agent] included 'QW-2 shoulder-fired missiles' with a 'ground energy unit,' 'firing unit,' and 'optical aiming device,' and the proposal forwarded by defendant to the [agent] called for the sale of 200 such missiles for a total price of $18,308,100," the statement said. Last April, Wu told the agent that he had met with officials in China and that the daughter of the president of Cambodia would get a $2 million bribe for facilitating the arms deal. The two men sought to mask the missile deal by producing a forged letter saying the purchaser was the Defense Ministry of Paraguay. At the hearing yesterday, Wu also pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell $2 million in counterfeit money to an undercover agent. Other guilty charges by Wu included an admission of distributing methamphetamine and Ecstasy, as well as millions of counterfeit-branded cigarettes. The men were arrested last year in a federal sweep code-named Operation Smoking Dragon that netted 87 persons on charges of smuggling North Korean-made counterfeit $100 bills, illegal drugs and other contraband. Playing up "Party, Government and Army," Playing Down "Property Law "重"党政军 " 轻"物权法" David Kelly Deutsche Welle 17 March 2006
Hu Jintao, concurrently Chairman of the Central Military Committee, attended discussions last weekend of the PLA delegation to the National People's Congress, where he requested the PLA's 2,500,000 officers and soldiers to prepare to defend "national sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity" as necessary, and emphasized they must improve training and fully use modernised national defence science and technology. The Neue Züricher Zeitung noted that when talking to the military delegates, Hu made no mention of the recent tense situation in the Taiwan Straits occurring because Chen Shuibian "abandoning unification"; the article concludes:
"The reason that the Chinese media gives specially important status to Hu Jintao's meeting with the army delegates, is on the one hand to under score the unity of party and army under Hu's leadership, on the other hand to sent out a signal to the outside, showing China has consolidated its status in the world, specially in East Asia, not only in economic, but also in military terms. Next month Hu Jintao will visit the US, where certain think-tanks have released some briefings warning of China's rise and its challenge this will pose to the US. When talking to the military delegates, Hu again stressed that China will not be a threat to third countries, but at the same time reserves the right to carry on the most effective self-defense."
The question of legislating China's "Real Property Law" has been discussed for eight years, and the draft to be submitted now is the fourth. The NPC was going to vote on it this year, but China's leaders, worried the issue might launch a major ideological debate, temporarily removed it from the agenda. The Frankfurt Commentary Newspaper [sic] reports on the controversy.
"Professor Fei Anling [Vice President and Professor of the School of Civil, Commercial, Economic Law] at China University of Political Science and Law says that the Real Property Law will promote the peasants' land usage rights to a higher legal level, and may better protect their rights. China's peasants can only lease land from the state, they often become the victims of local cadres who unscrupulously and forcefully requisition the land. But last August, Beijing law professor Gong Xiantian's open letter initiated controversy regarding the Real Property Law draft. Gong Xiantian is an old Marxist known to all, he criticizes the new draft law as violating t the basic principles' pf communist party and socialism as stipulated in the Constitution, because it 'has replaced the inviolability of socialist property with the inviolability of private property'.
In China, which still calls itself socialist, such a view has great explosive force. Beijing prohibited discussion of changing articles in the constitution relating to private property as early as 2003, forbidding the national media to report it. It is mistaken, Professor Fei argues, to engage in ideological criticism of the Real Property Law. 'Whether our law is socialist or capitalist,' she says, 'is determined by how it allocates social interests.' The topic moreover is frequently misunderstood: it runs into opposition only because people think it will protect the rich, and corrupt officials. But, she argues, the law will improve the social conditions of the poor and disadvantaged, because government departments can now cancel land contracts in the name of the public interest, but the new law will clearly stipulate criteria for confiscating land." China defends military spendingPublished: 2006/03/04 07:50:44 GMT *Bangkok Post*
7 March 2006 Beijing (dpa) - Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing on Tuesday defended China's rising military budget, claiming that China's rapid development would pose no China's military budget jumps 14%Marc L.
China has said it will increase its military spending by 14.7% this year to
283.8bn yuan ($35.3bn; £20bn).However, a spokesman for the Chinese parliament said much of the rise would be to cover fuel and salaries and that China was a "peace-loving nation".Jiang Enzhu said the US spent a greater proportion of its economy on defence and that China had "no intention of vigorously developing armaments". The US has several times accused China of understating its military budget. Neighbours' concerns China's armed forces are the biggest in the world and have seen double-digit increases in military spending since the early 1990s. China is committed to a path of peaceful development Jiang Enzhu Chinese parliament spokesman The increases have caused concern for neighbours Japan and Taiwan.The US has also expressed fears over the spending on the 2.5m-strong military.Washington has several times accused China of understating its military budget. It said last year's spend was not the $30bn stated but closer to $90bn. China insists its spending is in line with rises in other governments.Mr Jiang said: "China's defence budget has risen in recent years along with the development of its economy."But the proportion of the budget given over to defence spending is much the same as in past years." China also says its military spending is dwarfed by the US. The US department of defence had a base budget of $400bn in 2005. Mr Jiang said China's increases would go on salaries, new equipment, training and higher fuel costs. He added: "I wish to emphasise that China is a peace-loving nation. China is committed to a path of peaceful development." Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4773358.stm May 05 Chinese Military At Least Two Decades Away from Rivaling U.S. ForcesChinese Military At Least Two Decades Away from Rivaling U.S. Forces, Concludes Newly Released Council Task Force Report
May 12, 2003
May 22, 2003 - China is pursuing a deliberate course of military modernization, but is at least two decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and capability. Moreover, if the United States continues to dedicate significant resources to improving its military forces, as expected, the balance between the United States and China, both globally and in Asia, is likely to remain decisively in America’s favor beyond the next twenty years. This is the central finding of the Council-sponsored Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power, led by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Admiral USN (Ret.) Joseph Prueher.
China is a growing regional power. If current trends continue (e.g., if Japan continues to eschew a role as a major regional military power), the Task Force expects that China will become the predominant military power among the nations of East Asia. China’s current force structure provides effective defense against any effort to invade and seize Chinese territory.
The Task Force notes, however, that while China will have the enduring advantage of proximity to Asia, it is the maritime, aerospace, and technological dimensions of military power in which Beijing has traditionally been weakest and the United States traditionally strongest. Consequently, a continued robust U.S. naval and air presence can offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future military capabilities into real advantage against U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years, if not longer.
The Task Force, comprised of a diverse group of former government officials, China experts, and other scholars, hopes that its findings will minimize in discussions about China the frequent alarmism and occasional triumphalism that characterized American debates about the Soviet-American military balance during the Cold War.
The report thus issues a double warning: first, don't overreact to the large-scale modernization program of China's military; second, don’t under-react based on the relative backwardness of the People's Liberation Army compared to U.S. military power. Attributing capabilities to the People's Liberation Army it does not have and will not attain for many years might risk the misallocation of scarce U.S. resources. Overreaction could lead the United States to adopt policies and undertake actions that become a self-fulfilling prophecy, provoking an otherwise avoidable antagonistic relationship with China that would not serve long-term U.S. interests. Under-reaction, on the other hand, might allow China someday to catch unaware the United States or its allies in Asia.
The one area of near-term concern, the report concludes, is in the Taiwan Strait. Here, China is more likely to use new technologies and asymmetric strategies, not to invade Taiwan outright, but rather to achieve political goals such as forcing the resumption of political dialogue between the two sides on the mainland’s terms. While U.S. forces would ultimately prevail in a military crisis or conflict, Beijing might be able to impose serious costs on the U.S. military if the United States concluded that it was necessary to commit air and naval forces to battle with China in defense of Taiwan.
The Task Force emphasizes that China’s military modernization takes place against the backdrop of much broader changes in China's economy, society, and politics. In technology, although China has emerged in recent years as an increasingly powerful competitor in global markets, converting economic into military power will proceed more slowly. Chinese capabilities to develop, produce, and—in particular—integrate indigenously sophisticated military systems are limited. While China is trying to offset this weakness by purchasing advanced technologies from other countries, the Task Force judges that these purchases will fall short of fully compensating for domestic shortfalls.
The report finds that, for the foreseeable future, China will be preoccupied with domestic problems—political succession, public health issues, non-performing loans and a potential banking crisis, rising unemployment, growing inequality, and corruption. To address these domestic concerns, China’s leaders need a peaceful international environment in general and good relations with the United States in particular.
The Task Force believes that in spite of the impressive growth rate in military spending over many years, the likelihood of ever-increasing demands for government funding in areas other than military development will in the long term constrain the pace of military modernization. Improving China's armed forces must compete alongside the challenges posed by social security, education, SARS, AIDS and other public health needs, science and technology, and large-scale public work projects for resources and attention. While improving, the ability of the central government to collect fiscal revenue still is limited. With growing resource demands, any economic downturn would sharpen the competition between military and non-military spending.
Influencing the political future of Taiwan is a focal point of Chinese military development and will remain so for the next decade. If there are major shifts away from China's current modernization priorities, the Task Force finds that America’s present rate of force buildup and maintenance of a robust forward presence in Asia would allow the United States to respond to any potential problems that may arise. The continued dedication of significant resources to the U.S. military ensures that U.S. capabilities do not stand still, and thus that the military balance with China will remain in America's favor.
Established in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a nonpartisan membership organization, publisher, and think tank, dedicated to increasing America's understanding of the world and contributing ideas to U.S. foreign policy. The Council accomplishes this mainly by promoting constructive debates, clarifying world issues, producing reports, and publishing Foreign Affairs, the leading journal on global issues.
Full text of the Council's Independent Task Force, Chinese Military Power Read the transcript from the Task Force Roll-Out: Chinese Military Power
TASK FORCE MEMBERS
KENNETH W. ALLEN is a Senior Analyst in “Project Asia,” the Asian security studies center at the CNA Corporation. He served twenty-one years in the U.S. Air Force, including assignments in Taiwan, Japan, China, and Headquarters Pacific Air Forces.
DESAIX ANDERSON is a writer and artist. He served as Executive Director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization as well as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, covering Japan, China, and Korea.
PAUL BRACKEN is a Professor of Management and Political Science at Yale University. HAROLD BROWN, Chairman of the Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power, is a Partner at Warburg Pincus and Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as Secretary of Defense during the Carter administration and was the first Secretary of Defense to visit the People’s Republic of China (in 1980).
THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN is a Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
BERNARD D. COLE is Professor of International History at the National War College. He previously served for thirty years in the U.S. Navy.
RICHARD N. COOPER is Maurits C. Boas Professor of Economics at Harvard University.
He previously served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and was Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
C. RICHARD D'AMATO (*) is Vice Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a former delegate in the Maryland General Assembly, and a retired Navy Reserve Captain. He previously was Foreign Policy Director for the Senate Democratic Leader and Staff Director for Senators Abraham Ribicoff and Jim Jeffords.
JOHN DEUTCH is Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He previously served as Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Technology, and Under Secretary of Energy.
WILLIAM H. DONALDSON is Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He co-founded Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, is a past Chairman and CEO of the New York Stock Exchange, and served as Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance in the Nixon Administration.
JUNE TEUFEL DREYER is Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Miami, Coral Gables, and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She is currently a Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
DAVID M. FINKELSTEIN is the Director of “Project Asia” at The CNA Corporation. A retired U.S. Army China Foreign Area Officer, he served in multiple China-related assignments throughout his career, including Assistant Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and the Pacific in the Pentagon, on the Joint Staff, and teaching Chinese history at West Point.
THOMAS S. FOLEY is a lawyer with the firm Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld and a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan. Prior to becoming Ambassador, he served in Congress from 1965 to 1994.
JOHN FRANKENSTEIN is a Research Associate and adjunct faculty member of the Weatherhead East Asia Institute, Columbia University.
BATES GILL holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
BONNIE S. GLASER has served as a consultant on Asian affairs for the U.S. government since 1982. She is a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and at Pacific Forum, CSIS.
JOHN L. HOLDEN is President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He was based in Beijing and Hong Kong for fifteen years while doing business in China.
ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON (*) is the Governor James Albert Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at Harvard University.
ARNOLD KANTER (*) is a Principal and founding member of the Scowcroft Group. He served as Under Secretary of State from 1991 to 1993 and is currently a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. ROBERT A. KAPP is President of the U.S.-China Business Council, the principal organization of U.S. companies and firms conducting trade and investment with China.
CHARLES R. KAYE is Co-President of Warburg Pincus.
MICHAEL KREPON is the founding President of the Henry L. Stimson Center. His most recent book is Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future. (Palgrave, 2003).
NICHOLAS R. LARDY is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics.
DEBORAH M. LEHR is Chairman of MBP Consulting and previously served as Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative at the U.S. Trade Representative Office and Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.
KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL is Professor of Political Science and William Davidson Professor of Business Administration at the University of Michigan. He previously served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council.
WINSTON LORD is Co-Chairman of the International Rescue Committee. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Clinton administration, Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China in the Reagan and Bush administrations, and President of the Council on Foreign Relations.
MICHAEL A. MCDEVITT (*) is Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the CNA Corporation and founder of CNA’s “Project Asia.” A retired Rear Admiral, he served in Asia policy positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as J-5 at Pacific Command.
JAMES C. MULVENON is the Deputy Director of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy.
MICHAEL PILLSBURY (*) is a consultant to the Defense Department, a research affiliate at the National Defense University, and a Councilor of the Atlantic Council. He formerly served as Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and as Special Assistant for Asian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
JONATHAN D. POLLACK (*) is Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and Director of the Strategic Research Department at the Naval War College. JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, Vice Chairman of the Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power, is a Consulting Professor and Senior Advisor on the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Program. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador to China; is a retired Navy Admiral; and was formerly Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command.
ERVIN J. ROKKE is President of Moravian College. He is a retired Lieutenant General and former President of the National Defense University. ROBERT S. ROSS is a Professor of Political Science at Boston College and a Research Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University.
J. S. ROY is Managing Director of Kissinger Associates, Inc. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassador to China.
ANDREW SCOBELL is Associate Research Professor and a specialist on Asia at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.
ADAM SEGAL, Director of the Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power, is the Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
DAVID SHAMBAUGH is Professor and Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, and a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution; he is presently on leave as a 2002–2003 Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.
SUSAN L. SHIRK is a Professor in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and Research Director at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. She also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State from 1997 to July 2000.
WALTER B. SLOCOMBE++ is a member of the Washington, D.C., law firm, Caplin & Drysdale. He served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1994 to 2001 and was Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy from 1993 to 1994. KAREN SUTTER is Director of Business Advisory Services at the U.S.-China Business Council. She previously served as the Director of the Atlantic-Pacific Program at The Atlantic Council of the United States.
MICHAEL D. SWAINE is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Co-Director of CEIP's China Program. He was formerly a Senior Political Scientist and first recipient of the Asia Research Chair at RAND.
G. R. THOMAN is a Managing Partner of Corporate Perspectives, LLC. He managed Chinese businesses in four companies as a former CEO of Xerox and is a past Group Executive of IBM, Nabisco Foods and American Express.
LARRY D. WELCH is currently the President and Chief Executive Officer of The Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, D.C. Before assuming his current position, he served for thirty-nine years in U.S. military forces, from private in the U.S. Army National Guard to Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
DONALD S. ZAGORIA is Project Director of the U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations Program at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.
Mr. Donaldson participated as a member of the Task Force until his appointment as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in February 2003.
Mr. Slocombe participated as a member of the Task Force until his appointment in May 2003 as Senior Security Advisor (Ministry of Defence) of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.
(*) Individual largely concurs with report but submitted an additional view.
TASK FORCE OBSERVERS RICHARD K. BETTS is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Professor and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and a member of the National Commission on Terrorism.
BENJAMIN T. BRAKE is a Research Associate in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
MARCUS W. BRAUCHLI is National Editor at the Wall Street Journal. Previously, he was the Journal's China Bureau Chief and before that its Asia correspondent.
JEROME A. COHEN is an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a Professor at New York University Law School, specializing on China.
ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY is C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
KARL EIKENBERRY is a Major General in the U.S. Army and is the Security Coordinator and Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. He formerly served as Defense Attaché to China and was Senior Country Director for China and Taiwan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
EVAN A. FEIGENBAUM is a member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State. He was previously the Executive Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Initiative at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
RICHARD L. GARWIN is Philip D. Reed Senior Fellow and Director in Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as IBM Fellow Emeritus in the IBM Research Division.
ERIC HEGINBOTHAM is a Senior Fellow in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
LONNIE HENLEY is a Senior Defense Intelligence Expert for Strategic Warning in the Defense Intelligence Agency. He is a retired Army China Foreign Area Officer and has worked in a variety of China- and Korea-related positions.
EUGENE A. MATTHEWS is a Senior Fellow in Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
DANIEL RANKIN is Special Assistant in the Office of Dr. Harold Brown at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
DAVID E. SANGER is a White House correspondent for the New York Times. DOUGLAS SEAY is a member of the staff of the Committee on International Relations in the House of Representatives, where his areas of responsibility include China, Russia and the former Soviet Union, nonproliferation, and public diplomacy, among others.
JAMES J. SHINN is a Visiting Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. An Aircraft Carrier for China?By David Lague, International Herald Tribune
 MONDAY, JANUARY 30, 2006 As China builds a military to match its growing economic power, its neighbors and potential rivals including the United States have puzzled over a key question: When will the Chinese Navy launch an aircraft carrier?
For decades, senior Chinese military and political officials have argued that for the country to become a great power, the People's Liberation Army Navy needs to add these potent warships to its fleet.
However, the major obstacle to this ambition is that aircraft carriers are hugely expensive.
The two 50,000-metric-ton conventionally powered carriers now under development for Britain's Royal Navy are expected to cost a minimum of $2.5 billion each. To outfit them with aircraft could cost that much again.
And, aircraft carriers do not operate alone. They need a fleet of warships, submarines and supply vessels along with advanced electronic surveillance for support and protection.
For these reasons, most experts assumed a Chinese carrier was decades away.
But after double-digit increases in defense spending over much of the past 15 years, evidence is now emerging that China has a more ambitious timetable.
"I am convinced that before the end of this decade, we will see preparations for China to build its first indigenous aircraft carrier," said Rick Fisher, the Washington-based vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center and an expert on the Chinese military.
Fisher and other analysts note that extensive work now appears to be under way on a carrier purchased from Ukraine, the Varyag, now moored in the northern Chinese port of Dalian.
They speculate that the Varyag, fresh from the dry dock and, according to recent photographs, now painted in the navy's gray, could be used for training or even upgraded so that it was fully operational.
Not surprisingly, the Taiwan military has also been monitoring activity on the Varyag.
At a briefing in Taipei on Jan. 19, a Taiwan military spokesman, Liu Chih-chien, pointed to satellite photographs of the carrier at anchor in Dalian, where he said it had been under repair.
"Although China claimed that the Varyag will be used as a tourist attraction, the aircraft carrier would actually be used as a training ship in preparation for building an aircraft carrier battle group," Liu said.
Analysts also report that at recent international air shows, Chinese military officers have been showing strong interest in strike aircraft suited to fly from carriers.
As with earlier reports that the Chinese Navy intended to acquire aircraft carriers, Beijing denied Taiwan's claim.
"We don't know where the Taiwanese authorities got their so-called intelligence," said Li Weiyi, a spokesman for China's Taiwan Affairs Office, according to a report carried last week by the official Xinhua news agency.
Whatever the timetable, most naval experts agree that China will almost certainly build or buy aircraft carriers.
"Given China's strategic ambitions, it's a logical move," said Sam Bateman, a maritime security expert at Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies.
"I am sure the PLAN has carrier aspirations," he said, referring to the People's Liberation Army Navy.
Bateman said that, like the United States, two of China's neighbors, India and Japan, would be anxious about the prospect of carriers in the Chinese fleet.
What is clear is that China has already invested decades of effort in its bid to gain the technology and skills needed to build and operate these warships.
Admiral Liu Huaqing, vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission before his retirement in 1997, is widely regarded as the father of the navy's aircraft carrier program.
Heavily influenced by his exposure to top Russian naval experts during his studies in the Soviet Union as a young officer in the 1950s, Liu advocated that China should have aircraft carriers as the backbone of a "blue water" navy that could deploy beyond the country's coastal waters.
In military journals published in the 1990s he wrote that aircraft carriers would ensure China's control over Taiwan and territories it claimed in the South China Sea and match the growing military power of neighbors including Japan and India.
Liu, along with other senior Chinese defense analysts, also recognized that China was becoming a major trading power and would become increasingly dependent on secure sea lanes to carry its imports of energy and raw materials and exports of manufactured goods.
They argued that aircraft carriers would give the navy the ability to keep these sea lanes open in times of conflict or international tension.
Other analysts also say that a carrier would be symbolically important as evidence of Chinese power in the same way that U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups serve as a reminder of America's global reach.
Early work on the feasibility of building a carrier began in Shanghai in the early 1980s but the first clear sign of China's ambition came in 1985 when China bought a decommissioned Australian aircraft carrier, apparently for scrap.
However, before the vessel was dismantled, Chinese experts studied the design of this carrier and used the flight deck for pilot training, according to naval analysts.
The disintegration of the once-powerful Soviet Navy after the collapse of the Soviet Union provided further opportunities to study the design and construction of modern carriers.
Senior defense officials in Japan and Southeast Asia were intrigued when Chinese companies bought two decommissioned Russian antisubmarine carriers, the Minsk and Kiev, but speculation that these would have some military role in China proved groundless.
The Minsk was converted into a floating museum in Shenzhen, and the Kiev is also being modified, to serve as a floating tourist attraction in Tianjin.
In the 1990s, a number of countries including Spain and France signaled that they would be prepared to build or sell an aircraft carrier to China but Beijing apparently declined these overtures.
Some experts on the Chinese military say that plans to build or buy a carrier were shelved after 1997 with the retirement of Liu and renewed emphasis on military preparations to fight a war over Taiwan if the island declared independence.
Taiwan's proximity to the mainland means land-based Chinese aircraft and missiles would be well within range in the event of a conflict.
As recently as 2003 in its annual report to Congress on China's military, the Pentagon said China appeared to have "set aside indefinitely" its plans to acquire a carrier.
Instead, the Chinese military seemed intent on developing the firepower to sink aircraft carriers, a move clearly aimed at deterring the United States if it decided to intervene in any conflict over Taiwan.
This included a rapid upgrade of China's conventional and nuclear submarine fleet, the delivery of advanced Russian surface warships armed with supersonic missiles and an expanded force of Russian-made and domestically produced strike aircraft.
However, the purchase for $20 million of the 67,500-metric-ton Varyag from Ukraine in 1998 suggested that Beijing retained a strong desire for aircraft carriers and a blue-water navy.
The Varyag was still under construction in a Ukrainian shipyard when the Soviet Union collapsed and neither Russia nor Ukraine had the funds to complete the work.
A Macao-based company with close ties to the Chinese armed forces bought the carrier without engines, rudders or armament and said it would be moored in the former Portuguese colony as a floating casino.
At the time, most analysts said this seemed an unlikely explanation for the purchase because Macao's harbor was far too shallow to berth a warship of this size.
After a long delay while Turkish authorities, fearful of the danger to shipping, refused permission for the carrier to be towed through the Bosporus, the Varyag was eventually delivered to the Dalian shipyard in 2002.
The fact that Beijing went to great diplomatic lengths to persuade Turkish authorities to allow the transit was seen by some experts as further evidence of China's determination to improve its understanding of carrier technology.
There is tight security surrounding the Varyag in Dalian harbor, but work on the vessel is clearly visible from nearby highways.
Recent photographs show extensive repairs or maintenance to the carrier's superstructure and deck.
"There is a lot of work happening on that thing which is not consistent with a gambling casino," Fisher said. Conressional Report: PLAN Threatens US美国会调查局报告：中国海军威胁美军的11个领域
美国议会调查局在年末提交的一份报告中用大篇幅宣扬中国常规潜艇将对美海军形成“巨大威胁”。无独有偶，日本防卫厅近日宣布将在2006年着手开发针对中国潜艇“威胁”的新型鱼雷与声纳系统，该项费用已经被批准列入防卫厅技术研究本部的06年预算中。当世界已经开始逐渐厌倦漫天飞舞的“中国军事威胁论”的时候，日美已经执着了一年的“中国潜艇威胁论”似乎仍将2006年持续“流行”。 中国潜艇成了美国“心病” A Chinese Attack on Taiwan: Probable ScenariosTaiwan Perspective e-Paper, February 18, 2005
The Communist Party leadership in Beijing posits five "trigger" events, explicit or implied, which it threatens will compel it to use force against Taiwan. These are: A declaration of independence by Taiwan, internal "turmoil" in Taiwan, possession of WMD by Taiwan, a Taiwan military alliance with a foreign power, and unwillingness by Taiwan to come into "One China" unification talks with Beijing in a "reasonable" time.
Of course understanding actual Chinese intentions is different from knowing PLA military capabilities or possible strategies. Predicting intentions is risky, and often colored by values. So this is not a prediction that China will attack Taiwan. Rather it is an analysis of how the Chinese would use force if Beijing took the decision to attack the Republic of China on Taiwan.
But first let's dispel some of the conventional wisdom about Chinese policy toward Taiwan, which goes like this: The Chinese want peace, and economic development, and stability. They need years to "catch up" with the West. A Chinese attack on democratic Taiwan would ruin China's image, and set back China's foreign relations 10 to 15 years. Or, as Thomas Barnett wrote on page 241 of his recent The Pentagon's New Map: …" .none of the Pentagon's…scenarios about China make any sense. China wants the good life too much to succumb to its worst impulses…" Interestingly, however, the Chinese have been telling the world that Taiwan is a "core" issue for them, that they will forego the 2008 Olympics if necessary, that Taiwan belongs to the PRC, and must be reunited with the mainland . So, maybe Beijing is not bluffing.
And if Beijing is serious about Taiwan, how might the Chinese use force against the island? Two scenarios are drawing attention: A surprise attack carefully prepared beforehand with the objective of violently capturing and occupying Taiwan . Call it the "Capture" option.
I. Capturing Taiwan
Under the surprise attack option, China already would have put in motion a sustained military and logistics buildup, carefully concealed, with the objective of executing a future surprise attack on Taiwan, while keeping current Chinese diplomacy and other public behavior looking "reasonable". Surprise attacks are attractive for entities that need to compensate for military deficiencies. And surprise would complicate normal American "Indicators and Warnings." Deception operations also go hand in hand with surprise. The Chinese have shown a propensity to take risks, and their military doctrine now acknowledges preemption, as well as surprise. They call it "swift action" and "hidden efforts."
Again, the conventional wisdom argues that even if China wanted to attack Taiwan, they lack the military means to carry off an attack. But the skeptic says: Think Again…what if, for example, the Chinese are conceiling what they really have, and are building and hiding numerous additional troop ships? Or they have arrangements to draft hundreds of "junks" and other maritime craft for a Taiwan contingency? Or they have been falsifying the inventory and numbers of their sealift and airlift assets? And keeping them in hidden shelters?
Furthermore, what if the PLA has trained 30,000 rather than the American estimated 15,000 SOF/parachute troops? And what if they have more M-9/M-11 SRBM missiles than can be monitored? And what if the Chinese are using "routine" and enlarging exercises of PLAN and PLAAF assets as training "cover" for a future real scenario?
An all out Chinese surprise attack would be designed to capture, occupy, and rule Taiwan. In more limited form, a surprise attack might be designed to place just enough "shock and awe" on peaceful Taiwan to collapse the ROC government's nerves, without having to invade the island.
II. Coercing Taiwa
The conventional wisdom argues that the Chinese would not use force in sequenced, incremental fashion, as it would give Taiwan and the US too much time to react. But the skeptic wonders: What if PLA strategists are designing a coercive military strategy which, when combined with diplomatic and economic pressures and enticements, focuses just under American response thresholds? Or what if Beijing intends to push just far enough to achieve a partial fait accompli designed to collapse the ROC government's will? Or the PLA plans to attack when the US is preoccupied elsewhere (…as Washington is now with only one aircraft carrier in the Pacific area)?
Conventional wisdom again argues that the Chinese would not experiment with escalation since, for example, PLA missile launches of 1995/96 failed to reverse Taiwan's move toward democratic elections. But those missile launches, designed to coerce, while not hitting Taiwan, created real anxiety on the island nation , and nearly collapsed the Taiwan Stock Market, and produced billions of dollars of disinvestment—some say as much as $14 billion.
Moreover, signaling their intent and seriousness, and mixing force with diplomacy, is something the Chinese clearly have done in the past: Witness Beijing's diplomacy about Korea in early fall 1950; or PLA warnings toward India in 1962; or Chinese warnings to Vietnam in early 1979 ; or PLAAF penetration of the Taiwan Strait middle line in summer 1999.
Thus coercion by Beijing would aim at reversing threatening trends, creating instability on Taiwan, or even a major breakdown in the ROC's ability to govern…trends that Beijing would exploit with offers to Taiwanese "patriots" to join a "greater China." Indeed, it seems to me that Beijing has already activated th initial destabilization measures in conjunction with other, more benign appeals to Taiwanese opinion elites, legislators, and Taiwanese business investors. (As Lenin once said, "We will sell the capitalists the rope by which they will hang themselves.")
III. PRC Guiding Parameters:
Whether one aligns with the surprise "Capture" scenario, or the sequenced, "Coercion" scenario, the Chinese now have an inventory of military attack capabilities which is growing in numbers and sophistication, as they plugthe more obvious gaps in their amphibious and area -denial capabilities, their C4ISR, and in joint operations and logistics reform. Given these realities, what overall campaign parameters would guide a Chinese attack on Taiwan?
1. Keep the war damage limited…since killing the Taiwan goose that lays the golden eggs is not in China's interest. Post conflict reconstruction and Taiwanese resentment need to be minimized. A short war also limits the damage to China's international reputation. Thus I would rule out SRBM attacks on Taiwan's heavily urbanized and largely defenseless population.
2. Keep the conflict brief and control escalation. If the Chinese attack, they would need a quick win since the Americans are probably coming to Taiwan's assistance. A prolonged conventional slug-out between nuclear armed US and Chinese forces is a very bad idea.
3. Keep operational constraints manageable and orchestrated to China's advantage. Power projection and logistical sustainment are serious problems for the PLA. So is vulnerability to US high tech intervention. Thus one can expect the PLA to use mixtures of conventional and asymmetrical forces, and stealth operations, managing resources and re-supply tempos to feed its Taiwan attack objectives. Beijing could hit hard at first, hold Taiwanese assets at risk, then see if Taipei came to terms.
IV The Multifaceted Attack.
If Beijing decided on an orchestrated attack, the PLA has a wide repertoire of military capabilities, and they logically might be coordinated in an integrated campaign beginning with electronic disruption. The main aspects of the attack could involve four sub-campaigns: Destabilization Operations, Blockage/Quarantine, Invasion, and Missile Attack. The basis of each sub-campaign is clear enough:
These could involve harassment of commercial shipping and/or air traffic; information/disinformation warfare attacks; declaring the Taiwan Strait an "internal" water; or interfering with Taiwan's oil tanker lifeline, or "protecting" it from "terrorists" or "sabotage"( Taiwan consumes @ 250000 tons of crude oil daily); or special operations against critical Taiwan infrastructure nodes or facilities; or calls for "liberation" from Taiwanese "compatriots;" or computer attacks on key communications, banks, transportation hubs, and air and sea traffic controls, or more ballistic missile tests near Taiwan; or seizure of offshore islands like Kimen and Matsu.
China could initiate an escalating naval blockade, probably called a "quarantine," using units from the East China Sea Fleet to try to deny Taiwan re-supply and support from outside. Taiwan is heavily dependent on seaborne cargo imports. Under the guise of naval and air "exercises", possibly accompanied by missile "tests," China might warn merchant ships and commercial aircraft to vacate the Strait. Fast PRC patrol boats could be positioned off Keelung and Kaohsiung harbors, as PLAN submarines entered the Strait, while overhead Su-27s and F-8s provided an intimidating presence.
A Chinese blockade of Taiwan's western ports is more feasible than the island's east coast; east side operations would overextend PLAN/PLAAF capabilities and expose them to external intervention. Also, blockades take time to set up and are very visible. However, the PLAN has more than 60 diesel submarines; inserting dozens of them into the Strait would seriously complicate Taiwanese seaborne transport and re-supply.
Should the Chinese opt for a more explicit, high profile naval/air blockade of Taiwan, area- denial assets include high tech platforms like the PLAN's four Russian Kilo-class submarines (projected to be eight), and surface combat vessels like the Luhu-class guided missile destroyers with their foreign designed diesel-gas turbines, weapons, and fire control systems, and the Russian Sovremenny destroyers with their SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles. In April 2001, the Bush Administration offered Taiwan new diesel electric submarines, P-3 Orion anti-submarine aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers (but not equipped with the Aegis anti-missile system), and the PAC-3 TBM defense. But the sale has not yet gone through.
For China to take Taiwan by force, it would require an invasion. Chinese air superiority would have to come first so that Chinese Navy barges, troop carriers, and airborne troops had a chance. I assume the PLAAF might first throw in its 2nd and 3rd generation aircraft (MIG 23 and MIG 25s) to bleed off the ROCAF's air-to-air missiles. But in getting ashore, the PLAN would face serious obstacles : Taiwan has rocky coasts and inhospitable shores opposite the mainland. Nevertheless, the Chinese navy has underway a purchase of more Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines with advanced sonar equipment, in addition to its 60+ older diesel powered submarines. And the PLA Navy is adding new principal surface combatants to its current 60, to include Russian-guided missile destroyers and guided missile frigates.
The potentially starkest option for Beijing, presumably in coordination with an invasion of Taiwan, would be a ballistic and cruise missile attack against Taiwan's principal land targets, air bases, and naval facilities…while diplomatically holding Japanese and possibly Filipino bases and support hostage to PLA MRBM threats. Toward Taiwan, PLA short range missiles' quick flight time makes it very difficult for Taiwan to counter them, currently with the Patriot PAC-2s, and possibly even with the planned PAC-3s. China's SRBM buildup has been steady and ominous; the PRC now has approximately 550 to 600 M-9 and M 11 missiles in the south, and is adding 50 to 70 per year. A Chinese missile attack could cause havoc on the island . If China launched SRBM attacks against Taiwan, I think Beijing would seek to spare Taiwan population centers, possibly because of fear of ROCAF and/or US retaliation against Chinese cities. However, Taiwan might not show such counter restraint; Taiwan officials have been talking publicly about holding Chinese cities, and the Three Gorges Dam, hostage if China attacked.
V. US/ROC Reactions
Should China attack Taiwan, either as a surprise jump-off from ongoing naval and air exercises, or in a sequenced, testing manner, the fundamental question for American war fighters is: How well are US Air Force and Navy assets positioned, configured, and supported to challenge a Chinese attack? The US Navy is down to one carrier battle group in the Pacific. US B-52s are back on Guam, but Air Force fighter jets stationed in Hawaii, South Korea, Alaska, in Japan and on Okinawa, would require extensive tanker and reconnaissance support in a Taiwan operation. So the initial US military reaction would have to come from naval carrier air. If the US is denied offensive operations out of Japan and the Philippines, but reconnaissance and support functions were permitted, that simplifies things for the aircraft carriers. A carrier conducting strike packages into the Strait would need underway replenishment every three to five days during operations. If Manila and Tokyo denied all basing support to the US, then American support and reconnaissance would probably have to fall back on Guam or possibly Singapore…both are nearly 1,300+ nautical miles from the Taiwan Strait. The B-52s at Guam (and possibly B-1s and B-2s brought into Guam) could bring precision guided weapons to bear on a Chinese attack. But the whole operation…especially blunting the PLAAF fighter attack…would be much easier if Japanese bases stayed open and the Philippines and Singapore also offered combat basing to the US.
Moreover, if Taiwanese forces could not hold out, could the US get enough interdiction onto PLAAF/PLAN assets hitting Taiwan before PLAN and PLA assault forces had a secure bridge across the Strait? The answer is dependent on how fast the Chinese moved, their success with surprise, where US forces were in the region, and how our allies and friends participated. It would be a race against time. Another issue: What about PLA facilities on the Mainland supporting the attack on Taiwan? Would Taipei and Washington (together or independently) conclude they had to strike those mainland Chinese facilities? And what would be the Chinese reaction? Finally of course is the challenge of how ( and if) Washington and Taipei would fight together in order to synchronize actions and deconflict assets.
VI. Conclusion
I assume that deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan remains a principal goal of the US and Taiwanese governments and, of course, the US Pacific Command in Hawaii. The situation across the Taiwan Strait is not static, and it requires continued attention, planning and coordination by Washington and Taipei as long as the People's Republic of China refuses to renounce the use of force regarding the "Taiwan issue."
Lawrence Grinter is Professor of Asian Studies, Air War College, United States of America. These views are the author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Air Force or the US government. May 04 How Will China Threaten US Security Interests?China’s rapid economic growth, increasingly sophisticated diplomacy, and military modernization efforts are supporting increased activism and expanded influence both within Asia and in other regions of the world. Within the span of a single generation, China has moved from near isolation to a hub of the globalized economy, from fielding a backward, bloated military to a much more professional force boasting pockets of high-tech excellence, and from hostility to global institutions to active participation in multilateral organizations such as the UNSC and WTO. As China’s power grows, Beijing will have more options in using economic, diplomatic, and military instruments to advance its national interests in East Asia and on the world stage. With increased power and influence come increased responsibilities and the potential for clashes of interest with the U.S. and other great powers. China may assume the role of a responsible stakeholder in the international system, but that outcome is not certain. China’s choice of how to exercise its increasing global influence will affect its Asian neighbors and the world community.
This conference is designed to provide participants with a comprehensive assessment of China’s increased regional and global activism, the policy choices Chinese leaders face, the implications of increasing Chinese influence and activism for U.S. security interests, and policy options to influence outcomes in directions favorable for U.S. interests.
Featured speakers include senior government officials involved in establishing and managing defense and security policy and a wide range of defense experts. This symposium will be of interest to specialists in national security affairs in and out of government, military officers, the diplomatic and attaché corps, and members of the media.
China’s Global Activism
How is China using economic, diplomatic, and military tools to increase its influence and pursue its interests in Asia and other regions of the world?
What can we infer about China’s strategic objectives from the pattern of its increased global activism?
When conflicts arise within China’s grand strategy, how does Beijing balance and resolve those conflicting interests?
Military Modernization and International Influence
Taiwan has been the primary focus of China’s military modernization, but the PLA is also expanding its conventional power projection capabilities. What are current PLA land, naval, and air capabilities, and how are they likely to change over the next decade? What missions will drive development of power projection capabilities, and how will they influence China’s international role?
China has invested considerable resources in developing a new generation of conventional and nuclear missiles and associated C4I systems that will be deployed over the next decade. How will these new capabilities affect China’s role within Asia and its relationships with other major powers?
China has increased participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions and broadened the scope of military exchanges and security cooperation efforts. Where are China’s military diplomacy efforts directed, and what contributions do they make to PRC national security goals?
Regional Perspectives on China’s Global Activism (Africa, Latin America, and the Near East and South Asia)
How do governments, the business community, and citizens view China’s increased economic and diplomatic presence in their region?
How much interest do countries have in increased military exchanges and security cooperation with China? What do they hope to achieve via this cooperation?
Have developmental assistance, education programs, and soft power been effective tools of Chinese public diplomacy?
What impact does China’s increased presence and influence have on U.S. interests?
Policy Implications for the United States
What does the pattern of China’s global activism suggest about Beijing’s willingness to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder”? Which issues are most problematic, and what can the U.S. do to make cooperative Chinese approaches more likely?
How effective are existing USG policies, alliances, and diplomatic relationships in sustaining international support for the war on terrorism and other U.S. foreign policy objectives? What, if any, effect have Chinese activities had on the willingness of potential partners to cooperate with the United States?
Will increased Chinese global influence affect the USG’s ability to carry out its international agenda? If so, what adjustments should the USG make to its policies?
How can the U.S. achieve consensus on a grand strategy to guide relations with China? PLAN To Have Carrier Battle Group in Two YearsTaipei Central News Agency, Beijing Report, May 1, 2006
According to reports, the Chinese Navy’ s first Aircraft Carrier battle group will enter into service in two years, and will be based on the eastern edge of the popular Hainan province resort site at Yalong Bay, and will be deployed to meet any contingency in the Taiwan Strait? The Battle Group, which is now being organized, will have the status of an Army, and will be under the combined command of the South Sea Fleet and the Navy Commander?
There has been much news in recent years that China intended to develop its aircraft carrier capabilities, but it has not been possible to confirm this news from Chinese official or authoritative third sources? How China will utilize the carriers that it has purchased from Russia is also the topic of considerable speculation?
Duowei Monthly, citing unnamed authoritative sources says that China’sfirst carrier base site selection at a small separate bay area on the eastern shore of Yalong Bay near Hainan Island’s Sanya City, roughly two kilometers from the international resort hotels, is complete, and antisubmarine network construction is also completed, but the dry-land construction has not yet officially begun?
The new carrier battle group’s status as a full army (zhengjun) is a half step higher than the status of the existing Yulin Naval Base which is primarily devoted to submarine tending? The Carrier Battle Group will be built around the Ukrainian built Varyag, which is now being outfitted for sea service in Dalian and will carry an air wing of Sukhoi-27s.
The battle group will also include several destroyers and frigates. The Ukrainian carrier will not, as was reported in the foreign press, be a decoy or practice ship, but will be outfitted for offensive attack missions? The carrier was painted in traditional PLA Naval colors and insignia last August. The Carrier group’s primary mission is defense of the Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South China Sea. But it could be diverted from its base in Sanya to contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. May 03 China Carrier?By Prasun K. Sengupta May 02 China Will Have Aircraft Carriers in Two Years (Chinese)据香港文汇报记者王珏报道，近年来中国海域愈发不平静：钓鱼岛「主权」争议悬而未决；「春晓冲击波」一浪高过一浪；南海邻国不但持续强化海上管控、加快开采海洋资源，袭击、抓扣枪击中国渔民的事件更常有发生；甚至一向平静的黄海也因丰富的大陆架石油，引来周边相关国家的觊觎……面对这远远高于陆地的海洋风险，要想保护中国的疆土，加强海军力量无疑是重要途径之一。有外电称，中国第一支航母舰队将于两年后建成。 权威人士指出，当前中国海洋安全形势异常复杂与严峻，不仅岛礁主权争端、海洋油气与渔业资源争夺及海域划界争议等现有海上矛盾仍然存在，公海局势更加恶化，且局部恐有冲突激化的危险。 总体来说，局势「南缓东紧」：本来非常尖锐的南海斗争因近几年中国、菲律宾与越南达成共同开发和合作调查的协议，出现了相对纾缓的迹象；但在东海，由于日本政府恶劣的态度和行径，情况正好相反。 外电：中国航母舰队两年建成 在今年两会期间，解放军高级将领曾向本报透露，中国正在组建航母舰队。而据外电昨天(1日)的报道称，中国海军第一个航母舰队将在两年后建成，航母基地选在中国海南省亚龙湾附近。 外电的相关报道是否属实，目前无从求证。而中国正致力于加强海上防御力量，打造一支满足中国海防需要的强大海军，却是毋庸置疑的。 据本港媒体日前引述新加坡东南亚研究所资深研究员迈克尔．理查森指出，中国迅速扩大的舰艇部队是其「防范海上入侵」战略的重要组成部分。北京正在建造四艘不同级别的潜艇，两艘是核动力，两艘是柴油动力。中国2002年向俄罗斯订购了8艘先进的「基洛」636M常规潜艇，最后一艘将于今年交货。 有日本军事分析人士称，中国可能在未来几年内部署类似可以攻击海上移动船只的弹道导弹的武器，自此具备「无可匹敌、前所未有的军事能力」。 海洋战争风险大于陆地 解放军海军指挥学院一位专家指出，中国周边安全存在的挑战，海洋方向（即东、南方向）的形势比陆地方向（即西、北方向）严峻，不仅存在台湾、南海、钓鱼岛和东海大陆架等事关中国主权和安全的问题，还存在影响区域形势全局的朝鲜半岛这一热点问题。同时中国在该方向面临的军事威胁和战争风险大大高于陆地方向。同时，他指出，目前，中国的安全防卫能力与海洋方向安全形势的严峻性不相称，与主要安全对手之间的军事实力差距较大。为有效地维护国家的主权、安全和领土完整，必须加大海洋防卫能力建设的力度。 中国瞄准深海大洋 据新华社记者从日前举行的中国大洋工作15年成果展上获悉，中国科学家将进一步向深海大洋进军，有关部门正酝酿加强深海考察能力。 酝酿建设的国家深海基地，将「落户」青岛。深海基地将建成面向全国深海科学研究、海洋资源调查、深海装备研发和试验、海洋新兴产业服务全面开放的国家平台。基地主要包括：深海勘查及其保障中心，深海装备应用技术发展研究、试验和信息中心，深海装备模拟培训中心，深海技术产业化转化和作业服务中心，深海科学技术普及中心。 深海基地初步规划的土建总面积为26,500平方米，还将建设一个280延长米的工作母船码头和相应配套的试验室。基地计划在2015年建成。 大洋工作离不开考察船。目前，中国科学家进入大洋进行考察，主要依靠「大洋一号」，建造「大洋二号」成了大洋人的心愿。计划中的「大洋二号」船的主要使命将是：承担7,000米载人潜水器、6,000米自治水下机器人和大深度遥控潜水器海上试验和勘查作业任务，承担海底热液硫化物、生物基因等深海多种资源勘查任务，承担深海大型装备海上试验任务。这条考察船的排水量将达6,000吨，经济航速15节，续航力15,000海里，定员75人。 各国强化海洋战略保安全 当今世界，海洋不仅成为各国联系的纽带，同时也是重要的利益交织点。世界上200余个国家中，152个沿海。近年来，沿海各国普遍重视海洋，试图在新一轮国际海洋竞争当中抢占先机，并纷纷调整自己的海洋发展战略。 为迎接新的国际海洋法带来的新机遇和新挑战，1997年加拿大出台了《海洋法》，制定了国家的发展战略；1998年澳大利亚出台了《澳大利亚海洋政策》；美国1998年和2002年先后两次召开全国海洋工作会议，并且成立了国家海洋政策委员会，2004年颁布了新的海洋政策和行动计划，用于指导美国在新的世纪海洋工作；俄罗斯和印度等海洋大国，也制定了新的海洋政策。 特别值得关注的是日本。日本在2005年底11月，制定了《21世纪日本海洋政策建议》，针对日本海洋监管机构不够完善，提出了若干建议，其中包括明确以海洋立国为目标，设置由总理大臣组成的海洋内阁会议，增设一名直接对内阁会议负责的海洋大臣，以及筹划设立海洋省和海洋厅等。 危机一：岛屿争端钓鱼小岛恶化双边 据介绍，目前中国面临的岛屿争端是，一些岛礁被周边国家非法侵占或者控制，主要涉及东海的钓鱼岛与南海诸岛。 自古是中国领土的钓鱼岛列屿油气及渔业资源丰富，且靠近中国大陆和台湾，在军事上是中国的前哨。近年来日本不惜不断恶化中日关系意欲染指钓鱼岛列屿，目的不仅在于钓鱼岛的局部利益，更着眼于更大的战略意义，企图占领后遏制大陆对台湾的控制。 其次在南海海域，256个岛礁中较大的50多个基本被越南（29个）菲律宾（8个）马来西亚（5个）等周边国家控制，中国只控制8个，包括台湾控制的太平岛。这些周边国家在政治、法律上寻找占用依据的同时，还大力加强海上军事力量的建设，以及进行机场建设、发展移民旅游等非军事化利用，进一步增加了解决难度。 危机二：海洋划界东海纠纷此代难解 有关人士指，除渤海无划界任务，中国其它三个海分别与8个国家，即朝鲜、韩国、日本、菲律宾、马来西亚、文莱、越南和印度尼西亚有划界争端，争议海域高达150多万平方公里，占主张管辖海域（共300万平方公里）的52％。 首先黄海划界，黄海总面积约38万平方公里，涉及到中朝韩三国领海、专属经济区和大陆架。朝鲜主张利用海洋半分线和纬度等分线；韩国要求中间线原则划界，而中国历来主张公平划界原则，即除考虑中间线外还有别的因素，如海岸线长度等。 南海划界，南海总面积350万平方公里，为中国最大海域。周边国家主张的海峡区域分别侵入了中国的专属经济线，其中越南117万平方公里，菲律宾62万平方公里，马来西亚17万平方公里，文莱5万平方公里，印尼3.5万平方公里。迄今中国在南海海域划定界限仅一条，即北部湾界限，中国与越南大致对半分。 东海划界。东海面积77万平方公里，涉及中韩日三国。韩国根据自身利益主张不同原则，济洲岛以南要求自然延伸，向西又要求中间线原则；日本历来顽固主张所谓的中间线原则，并且以钓鱼岛作为基点，单方面在中间划了一条所谓的中间线，并开始对这条线采取实际控制；中国一直坚持自然延伸原则，主张在东海大陆架一直延伸到冲绳海槽中心线， 中日所谓的争议区达21万平方公里，相当于三个渤海湾，目前两国各不相让。中日之间对于东海海域划界将存在长期的争端，一位中国官员曾感慨道：「我们这一代可能看不到划界的结果。」 危机三：资源之争春晓油田恐酿冲突 有关人士指出，中国拥有丰富的海洋资源，主要包括油气资源与渔业资源，仅前者，大陆架中共存有450至400亿吨的储量。 这些资源成为周边国家激烈争夺的目标。2003年南海周边国家在中国传统九段线内的海域开采油气资源约4600万吨，朝鲜等国也不断争取开采，涉外开采业务不断频繁。而在争端中近期最值得关注、影响最大的，当属日本针对春晓油田采取一系列的行动。在2004年7月7日，日本派出强大的团队来到中国海域勘探，不仅租用先进的挪威船只，还配备88条护卫船，中方也派出船只应对，双方对峙非常激烈；2005年7月14日，日本政府又宣布授予帝国石油公司在该海域的勘探权，公然向中国挑□，此外通过了《关于海洋结构物安全水域的法案》，以及申请约29亿美元的经费用于更新巡逻艇与侦察机。 「春晓油田」之争可谓近期中日在海洋争端乃至整个两国关系上最严重的事件。有关人士呼吁，中日应该采取积极稳妥的应对措施，若处理不好，在这个海域有两国恐有爆发激烈冲突的可能。 为维护中国权益，中国海监总队开展了对日东海油气资源开发专项执法行动。据官方资料显示，自2004年7月7日至2005年6月，针对日本政府单方面在中日争议海区进行海底油气资源调查这一做法，派出中国海监飞机146架次、中国海监船舶18批次，对日本海底油气资源调查船队实施了历时12个月的跟踪监视和监督管理，以表明中国政府对该海域主权权益的原则立场，显示管辖的能力与决心。 □ 香港文汇报 Six-Nation Bloc Plans Anti-Terror ManeuversBy Edward Cody
BEIJING, April 26 -- China, Russia and four Central Asian nations announced Wednesday that they will hold joint anti-terrorism exercises next year, emphasizing a desire to balance U.S. military influence in Asia with stepped-up preparations of their own.
The regional security grouping, known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its activities have centered mainly on guarding against cross-border threats to internal stability, particularly from militant Islamic groups.
Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission, said the plans for joint drills demonstrate the group's growing role in maintaining security in the region, the official New China News Agency said. He vowed that defense ministers from the six nations will work together to combat what China calls the "three forces" -- separatism, terrorism and extremism -- that threaten to provoke unrest in the area.
In a communique, the six nations said next year's exercises will be held in Russia. They did not detail what activities were planned. But the Russian defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, told reporters here that the exercises will be designed by a group of military and anti-terrorism experts to enhance regional security coordination and are not aimed at any third country.
In China's case, the threat has mainly come from Uighur separatists in the heavily Muslim Xinjiang autonomous region of western China. Through common Turkic languages and history, the estimated 8 million Uighur people have maintained ties to their Central Asian neighbors even as the region increasingly is populated by China's Han majority. As a result, Beijing is eager to cultivate influence with the governments of those nations, lest Uighur militants find support and encouragement from across the borders. China also has a growing stake in maintaining a stable environment in Central Asia, which is a source of oil and gas for the energy-hungry Chinese economy. Although Russia traditionally has played a leading role in the region -- the nations of Central Asia were Soviet satellites -- Chinese diplomacy and trade have established a significant presence in recent years. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally organized in 2001 under Chinese leadership.
The first joint anti-terrorism maneuvers by the group were held in 2003, although Uzbekistan did not participate. They included some exercises in the Xinjiang region.
Separately, China and Russia held bilateral military exercises last August. They were billed as a drill against ethnic unrest but also were interpreted as a demonstration that Beijing and Moscow want the United States to understand it is not the only guarantor of security in the region despite its dominant role since World War II. May 01 PLA: Crouching Tiger or Paper Dragon?By Yu Maochun, July 2003 in Project Syndicate
When a senior defense expert recently testified before a US Congressional commission on China's military capability, he detailed the extraordinarily robust weapons program the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been pursuing. He pointed particularly to the PLA's increasing number of short-, intermediate- and even long-range ballistic missiles. But the expert concluded that, despite the alarming number of missiles, they did not constitute a "buildup.''
Baffled by that conclusion, the Congressmen began asking one question relentlessly: if the existing PLA missiles did not constitute a ``buildup,'' then what number of missiles would? The inability to answer this question clearly exorcised and angered both the senior expert and the committee.
But this episode illustrates a fundamental and frustrating problem: the more we know about what is going on in China the less we are sure about whether China has actually become a threat. We know China has doubled and redoubled its defense budget for, among other things, a massive weapons development program, including modernizing a deterrent and second-strike nuclear capability. Yet we cannot decide whether this build-up is menacing.
The prevailing consensus is not to regard China as a threat. But there are several serious conceptual flaws in this reasoning. It fails, for example, to take into account the hostile strategic culture against the US--and against US strategic goals in the Asian and Pacific regions-- that has long been ingrained within the PLA.
Moreover, a cursory glance at the PLA's readiness training, research and development, weapons acquisition, and indoctrination programs shows that Chinese officials are preparing to fight future wars not only against regional powers, but against a superpower. Its preparations focus not on parity with the US's modern weaponry, but on the development of ``asymmetrical warfare'' theory and capability. As the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the US brutally reminded us, a lethal threat need not come from equivalent military hardware.
The PLA has spent an inordinate amount of its rapidly growing resources in areas that give it an asymmetrical advantage, such as electronic warfare and human intelligence. Such tactics are aimed at confronting an enemy that is armed with the most advanced weapons systems, but is vulnerable to sabotage and asymmetrical attack, even latter-day guerilla warfare.
Throughout the PLA's history, a chief tactic has always been to launch asymmetrical attacks on an enemy's command and communication centers, thus obviating direct confrontations where parity in technological development would determine a clearer definition of victory and defeat. The PLA has never been deterred or become less aggressive when confronted with an enemy possessing more advanced hardware. This was true of Mao's guerrilla war against the Japanese occupation, the Civil War against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, the Korean War against the US, and even the Vietnam War, where China backed the North.
More recently, PLA officials have been among the most interested observers of the two US-led Gulf Wars. They have been impressed by US technology and remote firepower, but they have also been searching for US military weaknesses in such a context. While awed by American hardware, some PLA brass are convinced that if Saddam Hussein had been a better commander, the battle for Baghdad could have been, to quote Zhang Zhaozhong of the Chinese National Defense University, "George Bush's Stalingrad.''
One aspect often over-looked in foreign assessments of the PLA is its political indoctrination and the level of fanaticism this can create for an actual battlefield scenario. Despite all the years of stressing ``military modernization,'' the system of indoctrination by Political Commissars remains the soul of PLA units. We have seen the ferocity of ideologically intoxicated PLA soldiers during the Korean War, and even at Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Finally, China is far from being an Iraq or an Afghanistan. Despite the obvious imbalance with the US in terms of modern armaments, it would be shortsighted to ignore China's own formidable military hardware. It has a nuclear first- and second-strike capability; its own satellite communications systems; increasingly sophisticated and numerous aircraft and war ships; a rapidly growing economy to sustain high levels of military investment; as well as its own political and diplomatic points of leverage at places like the UN.
The supposition that China cannot become a threat in the near future, or in the next twenty years, is simplistic, because it ignores basic aspects of China's political system. The reality is that China has been through a half century of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary indoctrination, which emphasizes the predatory nature of imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism--with America singled out as the leader of oppressive global forces.
This ideology feeds a deep popular perception of China as a wounded, humiliated third-world victim and instills in the ruling Communist Party a powerful sense of unresolved grievance. It was from this mindset that Mao's theory of guerilla war--the last century's mother of all asymmetrical strategies of warfare--was born. It would be naive to assume that this mindset, which has become more deeply rooted in the PLA than anywhere else in Chinese society, is a thing of the past.
Whether China will prove to be a paper dragon of little military substance or a crouching tiger with sharp claws remains unresolved. But, as the saying goes, "Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.'' Yu Maochun, born in China, is Associate Professor of East Asia and Military History at the US Naval Academy. General Liu Yazhou on US Air ForceFrom Special Operations Technology Online Archives (This article was originally published on August 18, 2004 in Volume: 2 Issue: 5)
Recently Lieutenant General Liu Yazhou, Political Commissar of Chengdu Military Region Air Force, did a interview with the Chinese Kongjun Junshi Xueshu. The rather long exchange covered a number of topic areas and makes for some interesting reading.
Below are some excerpts (keep in mind that the translation in many cases is somewhat rough and some Chinese words may not translate with the exact context. (you'll see what I mean fatso!)
An India-China Axis?By Joseph Nye, April 2005 in Project Syndicate,
Is a new alignment between India and China rising to balance America's global power? Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao just completed a four-day visit to India during which 11 agreements were signed, including a comprehensive five-year strategic cooperation pact. In addition, Wen announced that China would support India's bid for a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council, and opposed the inclusion of Japan, which the United States supports for a Council seat.
With over a third of the world's population and two of the globe's highest economic growth rates, an alliance between China and India could be a serious factor in world politics. While both are developing countries – many of whose people remain impoverished – they also boast impressive capabilities in information age technologies both for civilian and military purposes. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it during Wen's visit, "India and China can together reshape the world order."
The two countries' recent rapprochement marks a huge change from the hostility that bedeviled their relations following their 1962 war over a disputed border in the Himalayas. When I first visited India as an American government official in the late 1970's, I was struck by my Indian hosts' fixation on gaining equal status with China. In 1998, when India tested its nuclear weapons, the defense minister referred to China, and then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee spoke of China as India's number one enemy. By contrast, on more recent visits to India, I have found my hosts referring to the need to learn from China. Trade between the two giants has grown from $100 million in 1994 to nearly $14 billion last year, and India's minister of commerce and industry has predicted that it will double by this decade’s end. One agreement signed during Wen's visit was a new set of guiding principles on how to settle boundary disputes between the two countries.
While improved relations and diminished prospects for conflict are welcome, relations between India and China are more complex than they appear at first. Not long before the visit of the Chinese premier, India hosted US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Ever since President Bill Clinton's visit to India, but especially under President George W. Bush, the US has moved from relative indifference to India to the development of a strong strategic relationship.
This new approach might have seemed threatened by Al Qaeda's attacks on America, which led to a strengthening of US relations with Pakistan's General Parvez Musharaff. But the US reassured India that they faced a common threat from transnational terrorism, and that the old Cold War pairings of India and Pakistan were outdated.
Secretary Rice made this plain during her March visit, stressing the importance of a strategic relationship, including a willingness to consider trade in high technology, nuclear energy, and co-production of fighter aircraft such as F-16's and F-18's. Shortly after Rice's visit, the US announced that it would honor a long-standing promise to sell F-16's to Pakistan.
While the announcement incited Indian protests, they were relatively muted compared to the past. One reason is that the State Department also issued a statement that America would help India to become a major world power in the twenty-first century, involving both a strategic and economic dialogue.
Several factors underpin this new American attitude toward India. Rhetoric about "the world's two largest democracies" is not new, but it fits with the Bush administration's new emphasis on promoting democracy. The increasing role of the Indian diaspora in the US, particularly in the information industries, also had an influence, as has the rise in bilateral trade accompanying India's surging economic growth. Equally important are strategic concerns about transnational terrorism and the rise of Chinese power.
The rise of China is a major factor in the politics of the twenty-first century. China has tripled the size of its economy in the past two decades, and has been increasing its military strength. While both India and the US seek trade and good relations with China, both are aware – and wary – of China's growing strength.
Thus, both seek to hedge their bets, and what better way to do so than by improving their strategic relationship? Neither country aims to restrain China in the way the "containment" strategy aimed at an aggressive Soviet Union during the Cold War, but both want to create an international structure that does not tempt China to throw its weight around.
India has a 3,000-kilometer border with China, a 2,000-kilometer border with Pakistan (which has been the beneficiary of Chinese military and nuclear assistance), and growing concerns about the security of sea routes in the Indian Ocean over which oil and other trade move. As one Indian strategist put it to me during a recent visit, "By 2030, we envisage the US, China, and India as the three largest powers in world politics. We don’t want a China- or a US-dominated world, but if we had to choose, it would be easier for us to live with the latter."
So, while improvement in India-China relations is welcome, it is unlikely to herald the beginning of an India-China alliance against the US. Rather, it more likely represents another move in India's age-old tradition of managing regional balances of power.
Joseph S. Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and author, most recently, of The Power Game: A Washington Novel. |
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